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Abstract
This timely conference in the PhyStat series brought together physicists and
statisticians for talks and discussions having an emphasis on techniques for use
at the Large Hadron Collider experiments. By building on the work of previous
generations of experiments, and by developing common tools for comparing
and combining results, we can be optimistic about our readiness for statistical
analysis of the rst LHC data.
1 Introduction
In attempting to summarize the content of such a dynamic conference, for my commentary I selected a
subset of the many talks, based either on the signicance, or simply on my somewhat arbitrary interest.
I have also tried to make some connections to earlier PhyStat meetings.
Data analysis at the LHC will benet from, and build on, the vast experience coming from LEP,
B factories, the Tevatron, and earlier experiments. The task during the next year is to consolidate this
experience into common tools that the LHC experiments can use, while continuing to add to them.
Already there has been progress in this area, and we have good reason to expect that ATLAS and CMS
will be better positioned to compare and combine results than were experiments at rst turn-on of other
accelerators. I begin by mentioning a few selected topics, then discussing some aspects of the Bayesian
analyses presented, and then turning to the more global issues of statistics at the LHC.
2 Topical Talks
2.1 P values and Nuisance Parameters
Luc Demortier has written an extensive review (174 pages!) [1] on p values (roughly speaking, the prob-
ability of obtaining a value of a test statistic as extreme or more extreme than that observed), including
many aspects of the inclusion of nuisance parameters [3]. I take the opportunity to mention as well my
recently posted annotated bibliography [4] on combining p-values. Especially since p-values are easy to
misinterpret, Demortier’s work deserves to be widely read.
One of many issues we face in computing p-values is what is the best way to enumerate all the
possibilities used in computing the probability entering into the p-value, while accounting for the effect
of the many places one looks. This is coupled to the issue of what value of a p-value corresponds to
a discovery. A. Drozdetskiy (with A. Korytov and G. Mitselmakher) and W. Quayle each described
ways to account for the multiple Higgs masses at which one looks for a signal; an interesting practical
issue is to what extent this effect can be factorized out of the more complicated analysis.
I neglected to mention in my talk what I perceive to be an alarming propagation in HEP generally
of the notion that there can be universal values of p-values which correspond to evidence, discovery,
and other words in the scientic process. Without getting into even more fundamental objections to p-
values, I hope that it is clear (to paraphrase Carl Sagan) that the more extraordinary the claim, the more
extraordinary the evidence must be, so that there cannot be a universal p-value for all claims.
2.2 Weighting Background-Subtracted Events
Jim Linnemann (with Andrew Smith), also citing Roger Barlow and F. Tkachov, discussed optimal
weighting. Historically, HEP seems to have under-utilized these direct" calculational ways of well-
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approximating a maximum-likelihood estimate. Is our computing now so advanced that we have less use
for it? Even if so, it would seem that this should be part of our statistics toolkit.
2.3 Banff Challenge on Upper Limits, and other studies
Joel Heinrich reported on the performance of methods employed by many physicists and statisticians in a
challenge in which participants were asked to provide upper limits or 2-sided intervals on cross sections
measured in a counting experiment with nuisance parameters. Heinrich then evaluated the results by
both frequentist and Bayesian criteria. This fascinating study has a lot of food for thought. In a related
paper Tucker (with myself) evaluated the frequentist performance of several algorithms, in particular
high-lighting the little-known application of the binomial test to a common problem [6]. Also, Rolke
(with Lopez) presented studies using the likelihood ratio test statistic.
2.4 Design of Experiments
Statistician Nancy Reid reviewed some of the theory of experimental design. This is another example
where most high energy physicists seemed to have missed a whole area of study that has some relevance
to our work. In particular, as emphasized in a talk by Jim Linnemann, it seems that the usual way of
checking the inuence of variations in parameters has missed important cross terms. We should all take
a look at these talks and the references.
2.5 The “Other PDF’s”
As he did at the 2002 conference in Durham [8], Robert Thorne (the T of MRST PDFs) reviewed the
status of calculating uncertainties on Parton Distribution Functions. This is still a very tough business,
which is however important for our experiments. Any consumer of these uncertainties (especially one
contemplating interpreting them literally out to several sigma) is well-advised to learn how hard this
problem is. Since For Global Fits, using ∆χ2 = 1 is not a sensible option, CTEQ uses ∆χ2 ∼ 100,
and MRST/MSTW use ∆χ2 ∼ 50, for 90% C.L. intervals (for which the book value of ∆χ2 is 2.7). This
is in the spirit of a (large!) PDG scale factor, and points to inconsistencies in the input data and/or the
model.
2.6 Multivariate Methods
Multivariate methods using machine learning techniques have been a very common theme in the PhyStat
workshops since the Durham workshop in 2002 (where Harrison Prosper provided a useful overall per-
spective on the several methods discussed there). At PhyStat 2003 (SLAC) and 2005 (Oxford), we were
fortunate to have one of the world’s experts, Jerome Friedman, actively involved. At the present confer-
ence, we heard talks on packages implementing many of these methods, TMVA (Fredrik Tegenfeldt and
collaborators) and SPR (Ilya Nasky). General frameworks (ROOT, RooStats) for incorporating these and
many other tools were described by Lorenzo Moneta and by Wouter Verkerke; I return to these in my
discussion below.
2.7 A Statistician’s view of Nuisance Parameters
Statistician Radford Neal emphasizes the likelihood principle, and therefore uses the likelihood function
as input to a classier. He urges us not to use frequentist condence intervals, particularly not two-sided
ones. He integrates out the nuisance parameters using a prior.
2.8 Use of Bayes’ Theorem for Particle ID
Iouri Belikov, while presenting the statistical wish-list of the Alice collaboration, showed a nice ap-
plication of Bayes’ Theorem to particle identication. It reminded me of a similarly nice application at
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the 2002 Durham Conference [9], and I have the same comment [10], namely a semantic one: while this
technique was called Bayesian, it would appear to be perfectly valid with the frequentist denition of
probability.
Bayes’ Theorem applies to any P which obeys the axioms of probability, including both the degree-
of-belief P commonly referred to as Bayesian and the frequency denition of P more commonly used
in HEP. The example of Belikov would seem to be perfectly consistent with the frequentist denition of
P , and hence pleasing to frequentists and Bayesians alike. At PhyStat 2003, statistician Bradley Efron
put it this way: Bayes’ rule is satisfying, convincing, and fun to use. But using Bayes’ rule does not
make one a Bayesian; always using it does, and that’s where difculties begin. [11]
3 Discussion of Bayesian Methods
3.1 Cox’s Five faces of Bayesian statistics (and the sixth from HEP)
Renowned statistician David Cox, in a stimulating talk, compared a number of approaches to the problem
of inference when there are many parameters or many hypotheses. I chose for the summary talk one slide
in which he described ve types of Bayesians among statisticians. What is notable is that typical HEP
Bayesians do not fall into any of these categories, if they are using priors which are uniform in arbitrary
variables (sometimes claimed to be preferred on the grounds that they are fundamental or what is
directly measured). This has been tolerated, I think, partly because typically the likelihood overwhelms
the prior (and frequentist coverage is in the end good), and partly because at priors for the Poisson
mean yield upper limits with conservative frequentist properties. However, it is unfortunate that there
are workers in HEP who are using (or even advocating) Bayesian techniques but who are completely
unfamiliar either with the subjective Bayes foundations of Savage and De Finetti, or with writings on
non-subjective priors such as those of James Berger and the review of Kass and Wasserman [12]. The
Jeffreys prior does not seem to be commonly used in HEP, and I am not aware of any examples in HEP
of the use of the Reference Priors of Bernardo and collaborators, although Luc Demortier has advocated
their use [13] (and in this conference put such software on our wish-list for statisticians).
Furthermore, the at priors used in HEP can be susceptible to ill behavior in high dimensions,
where one can easily add undesired information" without realizing it. As Bradley Efron noted at Phy-
Stat 2003, Perhaps the most important general lesson is that the facile use of what appear to be unin-
formative priors is a dangerous practice in high dimensions.[11]. Joel Heinrich gave a specic example
relevant to HEP at PhyStat 2005 at Oxford, noting a problem encountered with a multi-dimensional nui-
sance parameter and observing, In hindsight, this should have led us to distrust a prior at in multiple
dimensions, since this is well known to lead to problems [14].
Thus, I had a somewhat questioning reaction to the talk by Leszek Roskowski on A Bayesian ap-
proach to Constrained MSSM, but I hope in a constructive way. The problem described is an important,
difcult one, namely trying to synthesize particle and cosmological data in order to constrain supersym-
metric models. Closely related work was presented by Lafaye (with Plehn, Rauch, Zerwas) regarding
Stter. While I have not studied the physics inputs and models for these talks, it would appear that the
latter talk explored more of the space of methods, as I would advocate. Once one has the likelihood
function, one can obtain either approximate frequentist condence regions via the prole likelihood (MI-
NUIT MINOS in HEP), or Bayesian credible regions by adding priors and integrating. As has been much
discussed at past PhyStat conferences, the rst step (plotting contours of the likelihood) is always useful,
if only to be used as comparison with other methods. For a Bayesian analysis, before multiplying the
likelihood by the prior, it can be very instructive to take only the multi-dimensional priors, marginalize
over the nuisance parameters, and see what one is left with, i.e., the posterior one would obtain if the
likelihood function were constant.
It would seem that only after performing these two exercises is one truly prepared to multiply the
likelihood and the prior, and start integrating. With a sensitivity analysis to compare various priors, and
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with comparison to the prole likelihood answer, one can understand if one is faced with a pathological
situation (for example where the likelihood has a spike that is so narrow that there is negligible area under
it in any reasonable metric), or is in asymptopia (where all methods agree), or somewhere in between.
Statistician Paul Baines (with Xiao-Li Meng) gave an enticing, if somewhat sobering talk on Prob-
ability Matching Priors, i.e., priors which lead to posterior intervals with good frequentist coverage. A
bottoms-up approach is extremely difcult. Meanwhile in HEP we have gained quite a bit of experience
regarding specic cases when Bayesian calculations give reasonable coverage; it important to continue
to do so.
3.2 James Berger on Bayesian analysis: objectivity, multiplicity and discovery
It was a pleasure to have statistician Jim Berger back, as he was rst introduced to our community at
the Fermilab Condence Limits Workshop in 2000 [15]. He is a leading proponent of the Objective
Bayes approach in which one uses Bayesian techniques (thereby building in the likelihood principle
and consistent treatment of probabilities once the all-important priors are chosen) with priors which do
not always represent personal belief, but rather are chosen by some formal rules.
One striking aspect of Berger’s talk is that, for an unknown binomial parameter, it is obvious to
him that the objective prior to use is the Jeffreys prior, from both the objective Bayesian (invariance)
and frequentist (approximate coverage) points of view. And yet, in HEP, on several occasions I have
seen people seeking a non-informative prior for a binomial parameter and without any thought taking
the uniform prior. In higher dimensions, Berger advocates the use of Reference Priors, and we discussed
with him how useful it would be to have some software tools for this.
Berger conveyed a key part of his message to us in both 2000 and 2007. In 2000 [15], Berger
said, What should be the view today: Objective Bayesian analysis is the best frequentist tool around.
(This was after quoting M.G. Kendall, whom we in HEP know best via his book with A. Stuart, as
giving the ‘old’ frequentist viewpoint of Bayesians: ...if they [Bayesians] would only do as he [Bayes]
did and publish posthumously we should all be saved a lot of trouble. [16].) An important part of
his message this year is that Good versions [of Objective Bayes] are argued to yield better frequentist
answers than asymptotic frequentist methods, concluding that There is great appeal to simultaneously
being objective Bayesian and frequentist.
In Durham in 2002, we had the pleasure of interacting with a Bayesian statistician of a different
avor, Michael Goldstein [17], who is solidly in the (personalistic) subjective camp. He understood of
course that one cannot publish only a posterior probability based on one’s personal subjective prior. The
key point, which I believe our community has been rather feeble in undertaking, is to study the sensitivity
of the result to changing the prior. In the 2002 Proceedings, Goldstein says, Again, different individuals
may react differently, and the sensitivity analysis for the effect of the prior on the posterior is the analysis
of the scientic community, so that the answer should now be an interval of posterior values which may
be reasonably held by individual scientists...In this view, a sensitivity analysis over the reasonable a priori
judgments of the scientic community gives the full analysis. I copied from his transparencies at the
time a slogan which I think Bayesians in HEP should take to heart: Sensitivity Analysis is at the heart
of scientic Bayesianism.
As we go forward in HEP, I hope that high energy physicists using Bayesian methods will look to
both of these points of view for understanding.
4 Collider Physics
Complementary overview talks with lots of food for thought were presented by Wade Fisher (Tevatron
methods), Kyle Cranmer (practical problems in LHC searches), and Eilam Gross (ATLAS+CMS wish-
list), with related talks by Yuehong Xie (LHCb wish-list) and Iouri Belikov (ALICE wish-list). As to
summarize these important talks would be tantamount to repeating them, I urge everyone to consult the
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writeups in these proceedings.
In trying to synthesize all the experience from past experiments, we have the sociological lessons
as well as the statistical ones. At the 2002 Durham workshop, Chris Parkes provided some fascinating in-
sight into the combination of LEP results [18], and the Tevatron experience demonstrated similar issues.
Meanwhile, as a result of the PhyStat conferences and our interaction with statisticians, we have learned
a lot about the technical and foundational aspects of many of our methods. Like the statisticians before
us, we seem to be getting over the hump of foundational wars and becoming pragmatists, and we are
getting some residual skirmishes out of the way before we have data. And we understand the necessity
to compare and combine results in order to maximize return on society’s huge investment in us.
For me the ideal situation, which is indeed already underway, is for ATLAS and CMS to have
a technical framework in which results can be compared and combined in a transparent way, while
allowing for differences of opinion about which method is preferred. One of the key aspects is to make
it easy for an experimenter to compute a result (statistical signicance of an effect, a measured value,
or an interval) by multiple techniques, so that the consuming physicist is not conned to the narrow
preferences of one analyst.
In this respect, I am quite enthusiastic about all the work (by many people) described in talks
by Lorenzo Moneta and Wouter Verkerke. From the ROOT environment, one will be able to perform
analyses, share the results, and combine analyses, both for multiple channels within one experiment, and
with other experiments. Since the workshop, progress has continued in this direction, with involvement
of physicists from both ATLAS and CMS.
If we take interval estimation (including nuisance parameters) as an example, the three main
classes of methods were discussed during the workshop:
 Prole likelihood, known in HEP as the MINUIT MINOS method, based on likelihood ratios
(differences in log likelihood), without attaching a metric to the unknown parameters.
 Bayesian methods, based on the likelihood function, with metric attached via the prior pdf.
 Frequentist condence intervals, either constructed a la Neyman, or by a technique meant to assure
frequentist coverage.
It is common to mix aspects of the methods, for example integrating out some nuisance parameters in
a prole likelihood or frequentist condence interval treatment. The RooStats framework is gathering
momentum as a forum where technical implementations of all of the above techniques (and popular
variants thereof) can be implemented with a common interface. Our community could then effectively
demand that a result derived from one technique also be derived from the other techniques, and that the
sampling properties be studied.
This will help to educate students and veterans alike. When the methods agree, one is happily
in asymptopia; when the methods disagree, one will be reminded that the methods answer different
questions and have different denitions of probability. Bayesian answers depend on the prior and can
have poor frequentist coverage properties, while frequentist condence intervals typically violate the
likelihood principle and the probability of containing the true value is a property of the set, not of any
one interval. Furthermore, as more advanced methods continue to be developed and are plugged in, in
this environment one should be able to evaluate the new methods in a controlled way.
All this points to a future which I believe will be quite productive, as we eagerly await rst data
from the LHC. By the time of the next PhyStat, we expect to have to have real LHC data on which to
demonstrate our techniques!
5 Thanks
On behalf of all participants of the meeting, I am pleased once again to thank Louis Lyons for his
continuing efforts to organize this series of workshops, and to thank his co-organizer of this meeting,
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Albert De Roeck. On behalf of the physicists, we thank again the statisticians who helped educate us and
showed only good-natured tolerance as we sometimes abused their discipline’s techniques and principles.
This work was partially supported by the U.S. Dept. of Energy and by the National Science Foun-
dation.
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